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Welcome Letter From the Dean
Welcome to this semester’s edition of Sports, Inc. The Sports Business Society (SBS) at the 
ILR School plays a very important role in engaging students who are interested in the sports 
industry in collaborative discussions and projects that help advance the world of sports. Given 
the rich history of the ILR School in educating some of the industry’s most prominent leaders, 
this group serves to make connections within the Cornell community so that our current stu­
dents can learn from our esteemed alumni’s various paths to success. The SBS also serves to 
educate the broader Cornell community on key issues from their own learning here at the ILR 
School as it can be applied to the sports industry.
The ILR School has recently established a deeper focus on sports. Last Fall, we held our in­
augural Sports Leadership Summit in New York City. Gary Bettman ’74, NHL Commissioner 
and Rob Manfred ’80, MLB Commissioner, were among our outstanding speakers at the event 
that featured more than 20 Cornell alumni and several special guests who are senior leaders in 
the industry. They provided their perspectives on critical issues that are shaping the future of 
the sports world. Our intent is to continue these types of events and add additional program­
ming that highlights Cornell and ILR leadership in the sports world.
I’d like to thank the members, past and present, of the SBS for their hard work and dedication 
to opening opportunities for their members and other Comedians to pursue their dream of a 
career in sports. The SBS members are following their dreams and making it real for their 
fellow students.
All my best for a successful year ahead,
Kevin
Kevin F. Hallock 
Kenneth F. Kahn ’69 Dean
Joseph R. Rich ’80 Professor of Economics and Human Resource Studies
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Words From the Presidents
As a student-run organization focused on helping students across the entire university 
connect their passion for sports with alumni in the industry, the Cornell ILR Sports Business 
Society is a trend-setting sports business organization in the country. The club focuses on ed­
ucating and preparing its members for careers throughout the sports industry through its five 
main platforms: speaker series, website blog, magazine, radio station, and the new research di­
vision. This year the club featured 16 executive board members and have continued to develop 
each platform, with a focus on integrating and evolving the research group which allows stu­
dents to work with real-world analytics and generate tangible results. The club has a general 
body meeting every other week. These meetings consist of a combination of career spotlights, 
debates about hot-topic issues in sports business world, or job opportunities in all areas of the 
sports industry. This semester our club participated in a Nationwide SB A Call, ILR Sports 
Leadership Summit, and plan on trip to the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference. Over the 
year, the club hopes to continue to grow and improve with ideas from students throughout the 
club.
The output of content through all the types of platforms is what continues to set this 
club apart from many other sports business groups. The Sports Inc. magazine is produced each 
semester and features a wide range of stories about current sports topics. The blog provides 
club members the ability to write more topical pieces on a weekly basis. The SBS report is 
produced every week and broadcasted through Cornell Radio. Additionally, the club is grate­
ful for all the alumni and other professionals who have taken the time to visit campus or Skype 
with us. The stories they share about their own careers, their advice for students looking to 
break into the sports industry, and even helping with networking has been instrumental in the 
success of the club. This year we have been lucky to have the likes of Charles Baker, Scott 
Malaga, Jamey Horan, Marc Cornstein, Eric Fisher, Ron Klempner, Jim McCaffery and Ra­
chel Krasnow speak to the club. We are very fortunate that our alumni have been so active 
with the Sports Business Society as it has been an instrumental part of educating and aiding in 
the job search for our members. As the alumni network continues to grow and spread across a 
larger array of the sports industry, we hope to continue our strong relationships and continue 
to connect them with the Cornell community.
The Cornell ILR Sports Business Society strives to both connect and serve student’s 
and alumni’s passion for sports business. Cornell has become one of the most well-known 
and respected names within the sports industry and the Sports Business Society hopes to help 
continue to grow that reputation for years to come.
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The State of the Union: Emerging Labor 
Tension in America's Pastime
Jake Arrieta found himself a new home in Philadelphia, but not on the terms that many had expected mere months ago.
Photo courtesy of the Wikimedia Commons
Noah Fink ‘19
The drawing power of sports in the enter­
tainment industry is not only determined 
by the immense gravity of the generation­
al superstars that have graced the sports 
arena, but also of the overall quality of 
the product placed upon the gridirons, di­
amonds, courts, and rinks. Achieving this 
quality of play is deceptively difficult, and 
perhaps the greatest adversarial matchup 
that shapes baseball is not a nail-biting 
World Series between franchises but rather 
players versus their very employers. All of 
the four major sports leagues in the United 
States have experienced some sort of labor 
stoppage in their respective recent histories 
that impacted the games in ways that either 
hurt the reputations of the sports or created 
the foundations for future conflict. Baseball 
in particular saw great upheaval in the de­
cade leading up to the 21st century, but it is
now held up as the model for labor peace in 
sports after two decades without work stop­
pages. The continued livelihood of baseball 
rests not only upon the shoulders of the 
generational players and powerhouse dy­
nasties that capture fans’ attention, but also 
upon the greater foundation of the sport as 
an industry and thus the relations between 
the players and the owners who pay them. 
The offseason from 2017-2018, however, 
brought to the forefront seeds of discontent 
within the game that could reach beyond 
this year and towards the negotiations of 
a new Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(CBA) in the next few years, potentially 
threatening the peace so costly that base­
ball nearly ruined itself in its achievement.
The state of relations between players 
and owners reached an explosive cross­
roads in the summer of 1994. Just two 
years prior, Bud Selig, the then-owner of 
the Milwaukee Brewers, had been named 
acting commissioner for a league that had
been wracked by collusion charges in the 
decade prior and a lockout in 1990.1 Hall 
of Fame baseball players such as Jeff Bag- 
well, Greg Maddux, and the late Tony 
Gwynn Sr. posted MVP-caliber statistics2 
in 1994, but their season was cut short 
and the World Series was canceled due to 
arguably the most divisive and damaging 
player strike in recent memory. The conflict 
caused many fans to walk away from the 
game even upon its return some 200-odd 
days later, and both the players and team 
owners had to rebuild their respective rep­
utations.3 To add further injury to the MLB, 
some of the game’s brightest stars and 
charismatic characters like “Goose” Gos- 
sage and Bo Jackson, never returned.4 The 
1994 strike stemmed mostly from proposed 
changes to the economic structure of base­
ball as ownership groups hoped to curtail 
the burgeoning costs of fielding teams via a 
salary cap, but the players hoped to maxi­
mize their worth on the open market. When
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the new CBA was agreed upon in 1995, 
changes such as revenue-sharing and the 
Competitive Balance Tax (meant to penal­
ize large market teams for spending over a 
prescribed threshold) ushered in a new era 
for the sport as it regained its momentum 
with a surge in home-run fireworks and 
feats of athleticism (however controversial 
the means to those ends were). The MLB’s 
rise from the ashes of the 1994-95 strike 
showed the resilience of the sport, and the 
conflict gave way to what would become 
two decades of labor peace beginning un­
der the guidance of Commissioner Bud 
Selig.
Rob Manfred ‘80, the successor to Selig 
as Commissioner and a graduate of Cor­
nell’s ILR School, had taken up where his 
predecessor left off5 in the task of evolv­
ing a game that is steeped in tradition and 
American mythology. Baseball’s business 
has generally been booming during Se­
lig and now Manfred’s tenures,6 but is all 
as well as one would assume? Across so­
cial media platforms and echoed from the 
talking heads of sports, the recent focus has 
been on the moribund free agency period, 
in which many stars found themselves at 
home while their compatriots moved on 
to Spring Training or players signed con­
tracts that guaranteed them lower salaries 
than were expected. Many players settled 
for deals that do not even guarantee play­
ing time at the MLB level. Players such
"Baseball's business has 
generally been booming 
during Selif and now 
Manfred's tenures,6 
but is all as one as 
well would assume?"
as Jake Arrieta, one of the best pitchers in 
baseball since 2014, and J.D. Martinez, a 
Silver Slugger winner, found themselves 
languishing in the free agent pool. While 
Martinez was signed by the Red Sox as 
Spring Training kicked off, his contract of 
$110 million over five years was a quite a 
drop-off from the $200+ million over seven 
years that he had sought.7 Arrieta was even­
tually scooped up by the Phillies on a three- 
year deal netting him $75 million,8 two 
years and $25 million short of a prediction 
published on MLB.com in early October.9
Mike Moustakas, a very solid if somewhat 
inconsistent player, was predicted by Jim 
Duquette to be in line to receive a contract 
of around five years and $100 million.10 A 
slow free agent market forced him to set­
tle for only one guaranteed year and $6.5 
million.11 Commissioner Manfred chalked 
up the slow offseason to year-to-year dif­
ferences in strategies among teams,12 but 
it is also possible that an incredibly talent­
ed free agent pool in the winter of 2018 is 
causing teams to tighten the purse-strings 
this year. After all, “rebuilding” is nothing 
new, and the Cubs and Astros are recent 
examples of success coming from years of 
futile (and cheap) teams. Some players and 
representatives have reportedly felt that 
the slow offseason was not some random 
chance but was in fact an effort of collusion 
by league ownership to keep payrolls down 
by collectively low-balling or not signing 
players.13 Reacting to the stagnancy of the 
market, the Major League Baseball Play­
ers’ Association (MLBPA) opened its own 
spring training facility for those still left 
on the market to hone their craft in their 
unexpected idleness.14 This situation has 
created some noticeable chafing between 
the players and owners, with Los Angeles 
Angels outfielder Justin Upton suggesting 
that the free agency process is one that 
“is about finding a team that matches [a 
player]”15 but that the recent climate has 
become more adversarial between owners 
and players over money.
It seems that Upton is not alone in 
his wariness of the free agent process. 
The MLBPA filed a grievance with MLB 
alleging that the Athletics, Pirates, Rays, 
and Marlins have misused the funds from 
the league revenue-sharing program by 
not bolstering their teams with quality free 
agent signings (to presumably help them 
contend).16 The Athletics, the focus of Mi­
chael Lewis’ 2003 book Moneyball, em­
braced the philosophy of working within 
the confines of their more limited market to 
create winning teams. The Athletics teams 
of the past three years, however, have 
struggled mightily17 and their committed 
payroll has been reduced over $10 million 
since 2014 (although it should be noted that 
their payroll jumped from $40,799,500 in 
2013 to $69,720,900 in 2014).18 Similarly, 
the Pirates and Rays have had teams that 
have contended seriously (from 2013- 
201519 and 2010-2013,20 respectively) but 
their recent squads have not found the same
success (somewhat peculiarly starting the 
year after payrolls reached their zeniths). 
The Pirates reached their spending height 
in 2016 at over $100 million, but that fig­
ure is projected to be closer to $60 million 
for the 2018 season21 after the Pirates failed 
to sign any notable free agents and traded 
away stars Andrew McCutchen and Ger- 
rit Cole.22 The Rays, fighting dwindling 
fan attendance, reached their peak payroll
"The MLBPA filed a 
grievance with MLB 
alleging that the Athletics, 
Pirates, Rays, and Marlins 
have misused the funds 
from the league 
revenue-sharing program 
by not bolstering their 
teams with quality free 
agent signings"
figure in 2014 with players under contract 
for over $82 million but have since cut that 
number nearly in half,23 including a sur­
prising move to designate outfielder Co­
rey Dickerson for assignment (who was 
then somewhat ironically traded to the 
Pirates).24 The Marlins, under a new own­
ership group headed by Bruce Sherman 
and Derek Jeter,25 shed salary in bundles 
this offseason with trades of Dee Gordon, 
Christian Yelich, Marcell Ozuna, and Gi- 
ancarlo Stanton,26 all players that were con­
sidered the building blocks of a once-prom­
ising Marlins franchise that tragically lost 
its superstar pitcher Jose Fernandez in a 
boating accident in 2016. The Marlins are 
no strangers to drastic shifts in payroll af­
ter initial hopes of contention, however, as 
they reached peaks in both 2012 and 2017 
with payrolls of over $110 million only to 
see selling-off via trades reduce their fig­
ures the next year to a paltry $35 million 
and then $69 million.27 The MLB has stat­
ed its official position that the grievance 
filed by the MLBPA has no merit.28 Others, 
however, are left wondering if the league’s 
revenue-sharing program, meant to help 
small-market teams like the Rays (rumored 
to have received $45 million from this pro­
gram last year)29 contend against larger 
market teams is either being misused or is 
simply ineffective.
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MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred '80 looks to bring America's Pastime to a larger audience in this 
age of social media, but will he be able to maintain the labor peace that has defined baseball in 
the 21st century?
While money is of course a primary 
concern in any industry, the passionate and 
sometimes rigid adherence to baseball’s 
traditions is another growing source of 
tension. One of Commissioner Manfred’s 
primary goals has been to make the game 
even more popular in the American sports 
realm of today, and he aims to achieve this 
via changes to the “pace of play” of Major 
League games. Some of the MLB’s broad­
cast partners have indicated a “fan issue” 
(primarily viewing rates and, for lack of 
a better term, attention spans) in its data 
collection, and it is Manfred’s hope creat­
ing shorter, up-tempo games will alleviate 
such issues.30 This line of thought will cer­
tainly draw a line between baseball “tradi­
tionalists” and “progressives” who would 
either find the thought of bringing about 
substantial changes to the way the game is 
played to be either completely unnecessary 
and meddlesome or overdue and welcome. 
Limited changes for 2018, however, have 
been agreed to by the MLBPA and include 
a limit to the number of mound visits per 
game (at 6) and a reduction in the dead time 
between innings used for on-the-diamond 
preparation and commercials for broad­
casts.31 Further proposals from Manfred, 
such as a “pitch clock” to force pitchers to 
make their throw within a certain period of 
time (somewhat similar to football’s “play 
clock”) have been taken off the table for 
MLB use until after this season.32 Players 
(who gave their consent to these changes 
via their MLBPA representatives) seemed 
to have mixed opinions on the moves, with 
some like relief pitcher Darren O’Day 
committed to change but hesitant about 
potential future changes (most notably, 
the “pitch clock”). Others, such as catcher 
Chris Iannetta, feel that the restrictions on 
mound visits this year affect the strategy 
and thus ability to play the game as it has 
been played, but he is willing to see it in ef­
fect.33 While Manfred can implement pace 
of play changes unilaterally without MLB­
PA consent, his hope is that these changes 
will be made with a spirit of cooperation 
and congeniality. The Commissioner’s 
course of action to encourage collaboration 
on this issue is most likely promising to 
many players. Those who share Iannetta’s 
view that certain changes already alter the 
strategic aspects of the game; however, are 
almost certainly wary that present chang­
es could bring future interference, with or 
without the cooperative efforts of the players.
Photo courtesy of the Wikimedia Commons
Major League Baseball has seen labor 
peace for over two decades, and it is within 
the best interest for all parties that it con­
tinues long into the foreseeable future. The 
current CBA expires in 2021, and the im­
pending specter of negotiations looms. For
"While Manfred can 
implement pace of play 
changes unilaterally 
without MLBPA consent, 
his hope is that these 
changes will be made with 
a spirit of cooperation and 
congeniality."
the owners, this will be an opportunity to 
protect their earnings from a labor pool that 
has seen massive gains in the past 20 years. 
For players, the negotiations will be a stage 
to ensure that what they feel is rightfully 
theirs is given to them and that their voice
is resoundingly heard. Perhaps this offsea­
son has merely been an anomaly, an active 
choice by teams to save their funds for a 
future run while the Commissioner makes 
cooperative strides to change baseball for 
the better. Should the market stagnation 
and reductions in team’s spending while 
MLB revenue is at its height continue in 
future off-seasons; however, there will al­
most certainly be a thickly demarcated di­
vide between players and ownership at the 
bargaining table. MLB’s labor peace will 
continue for the present, but will the future 
hold the same for America’s Pastime?
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Ripple Effects of the 
2016 NBA Salary Cap Spike
Alex Canzone ‘20
Before the 2015-2016 NBA season, the 
salary cap amounted to approximately 
$70 million. However, after a renegotiat­
ed TV deal, the cap jumped dramatically 
to $94 million—an increase of about $24 
million—during the 2016 off-season. With 
an excess of free capital due to the inflated 
cap, the 2016 off-season was wrought with 
careless overspending and risky deals. The 
consequences of these deals are still affect­
ing the league’s current climate. The 2016 
free agency period effectively broke the 
NBA’s internal economy, not only in terms 
of dollars, but in the league’s parity as well.
The Good:
2016 was not a year of exclusively poor 
signings, although many teams did over­
pay mediocre players; one team was able 
to acquire a generational NBA talent. I’m 
of course speaking about the Golden State 
Warriors, a team that in the season prior to 
the 2016 off-season broke the regular sea­
son wins record, touting an incredible 73-9 
season. Golden State also made it to game 
7 of the 2016 NBA finals, in which they 
lost by a slim four-point margin. Due to a 
combination of the cap spike and star play­
er Stephen Curry being under an extremely 
affordable deal, they made the play of the 
century and signed superstar Kevin Durant. 
While this was obviously very good for the 
Warriors, it was terrible for the rest of the 
NBA. How could anyone compete with a 
core composed of two MVP’S, two of the 
greatest shooters ever, and the DPOY? 
News flash, you can’t! With the acquisi­
tion of Kevin Durant, Golden State gained 
an effective monopoly on championships. 
Under normal circumstances, Golden State 
would have had to improve internally in 
order to avenge their title against the Cav­
aliers. However, because of the cap spike 
they were able to sign a marquee player 
in Durant. The “good” in this case is the 
fact that without the cap spike in 2016, the 
Warriors would have been unable to sign 
Durant.
The Bad (a lot of it):
It’s July 1, 2016 at 12:01am, NBA fans 
across the world are glued to their various 
screens waiting to see what jerseys stars 
like Durant, LeBron James, and Dwyane 
Wade will end up wearing during the next 
season. The first signing is announced, a 4 
year $64 million deal from the Los Ange­
les Lakers for Timofey Mozgov.... Wait, 
what? Mozgov averaged just 6.3 points 
and 4.4 rebounds the previous season.1 
538’s CARMELO metric shows 10 players 
most similar to another NBA player,2 and 
using this metric the two most comparable 
players to Mozgov are Francisco Elson and 
Mark Blount. Elson played for a whopping 
one NBA season in which he was signed 
for the minimum, and was subsequently 
waived the following year by the Philadel­
phia 76ers.3 Blount was able to recoup a 
modest NBA contract, as he signed a 6 year 
deal with the Boston Celtics worth $41 
million and quickly fell out of NBA rele­
vance.4 Mozgov’s contract was worth more 
than both of these players’ career earnings 
combined. The Lakers were able to move 
on from this contract, but in doing so they 
gave up a valuable asset in D’Angelo Rus­
sell.
Unfortunately, Mozgov’s egregious 
contract was not just an unfortunate outli­
er. The Brooklyn Nets threw a 4 year $75 
million contract at Allen Crabbe, which 
the Portland Trail Blazers subsequently
matched.5 Who are the two players most 
comparable to Crabbe according to 538? 
Arron Afflalo and Anthony Morrow. When 
Afflalo was 25—the current age of Crab­
be—he was paid a salary of approximately 
$6 million by the Denver Nuggets, com­
pared to Crabbe’s yearly salary of around 
$19 million. When Morrow was 25 years 
old, he was paid a flat $4 million. Morrow 
and Afflalo’s combined salaries at the same 
age were about half of Crabbe’s current 
salary. Even after taking inflation into ac­
count, this is a remarkable overpayment.
Another egregious payment that also 
involves the Portland Trail Blazers is the 
large contract offered to Evan Turner; 
Turner was given a $4 year contract worth 
$70 million. 538’s metric identifies the two 
most comparable players as Shaun Living­
ston and Gerald Henderson. Livingston at 
Turner’s age was paid a salary worth ap­
proximately $1 million by the Cleveland 
Cavaliers, while Henderson was paid $9 
million by the Philadelphia 76ers.3
However, these signings, while egre­
gious, pale in comparison to the inarguable 
worst signing of the year—possibly of all 
time—in Joakim Noah. The New York 
Knicks (of course) signed Noah to a 4 year, 
$72 million deal after a season in which he 
barely saw the floor due to injury and a se­
vere decline in play.1 Phil Jackson, former 
President of Basketball Operations for the 
New York Knicks, decided Noah deserved
Finals MVP Kevin Durant after Game 5 of the 2017 NBA Finals.
Photo courtesy ofYoutube.com
10 Sports, Inc.
this contract after the veteran center was 
able to do a pull up on Jackson’s arm; as a 
Knicks fan I wish I was joking. In his first 
season for the Knicks, Noah averaged 5 
points and 8 rebounds, appearing in only 
46 games. This year, Noah has appeared in 
a whopping 7 games, averaging 1.7 points 
and 2 rebounds. Currently, Noah is most 
known for getting into a physical alterca­
tion with Knicks’ head coach Jeff Homacek 
and essentially being kicked off the team.
Unfortunately, the effects of July 2016 
are still being felt across the league. For ex­
ample, in 2017 the Lakers were forced to 
move Mozgov’s contract in order to create 
space. They were successful in this, but at 
the cost of including D ’Angelo Russell in 
the trade. Russell has had an up and down 
career since he entered the league, includ­
ing some glaring off the court issues, but he 
is a young promising player nonetheless. 
The former #2 overall pick, who is averag­
ing 16 points a game this season, is a player 
that the Lakers wouldn’t have had to give 
up if they hadn’t signed a twelfth option to 
a star worthy contract (Mozgov). However, 
in this trade the Lakers received the 27th 
pick in the 2017 NBA draft, that they used 
to select Kyle Kuzma. Confirming that no 
matter what happens, the basketball gods 
will never allow the Lakers to fail.
The previously mentioned Allen Crabbe 
was also traded during the 2017 off-season, 
although the Trail Blazers didn’t have to 
give up anything—receiving Andrew Nich­
olson—they were forced to move a young 
6’8 shooter for cap relief. These trades 
have one thing in common, both being 
completely unnecessary. The Lakers would 
not have had to give up a former #2 pick 
after his second year in the league if they 
hadn’t panicked and signed Mozgov to a
"However, this only proves 
the need for a gradual 
increase in the cap "
massive deal. Similarly, the Trail Blazers 
matched a ridiculous offer sheet in order 
to keep a young player, whom they subse­
quently traded the following year for noth­
ing but cap relief. As a result of extreme 
spending the past few off-seasons, teams 
are either giving up assets to correct their 
mistakes or operating with little to no cap 
space. The New York Knicks are one of the 
worst teams in the league, but they do not 
have the cap space to improve as a result
of Joakim Noah’s contract. His $55 mil­
lion guaranteed is the largest on the books, 
despite him being the worst player on the 
team.
Some may argue that the horrendous 
signings of the 2016 off-season period 
were simply a product of poor execution 
by front offices, not the cap itself. Howev­
er, this only proves the need for a gradual 
increase in the cap. The NBA should not be 
running as a free market, as the league has 
far too many meddlesome and impatient 
owners for this to work. It’s unfair to the 
fans who dedicate their time and money to 
the teams they love so much. In fact, the 
league already has rules in place that pre­
vent teams from getting in their own way. 
Such as the Stepien Rule, which forbids 
teams from trading their first round picks 
in consecutive years. The rule essentially 
prevents teams from risking their long term 
futures for short term gains. In regard to the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, there 
are many rules in place that protect teams 
and players, like restricted free-agency and
"Thus, the NBA will go 
through a perpetual 
four-year cycle of over­
spending; the 2016 
off-season effectively 
disrupted the natural order 
of the NBA economy."
bird rights. Restricted free agency allows a 
team to match any other offer their play­
er receives for his first deal after his rook­
ie contract. This provides small market 
teams with a crucial competitive advantage 
in a league shared by wealthy large mar­
ket teams such as Boston and Los Ange­
les. Bird rights provide teams with a way 
to retain star players that are crucial to the 
franchise without risking the talent of the 
surrounding team. If a player has spent 
more than three seasons with one club, that 
club can exceed the salary cap in order to 
re-sign him.
Lastly, the compulsory overspend­
ing during the 2016 off-season has led to 
a heavily saturated market in which free 
agents are being paid way below market 
value. In the 2017 off-season only one re­
stricted free agent (Otto Porter Jr.) was of­
fered a lucrative max deal for over $75 mil­
lion. In comparison, 5 restricted free agents
Joakim Noah at his introductory press 
conference after signing with the New York 
Knicks in 2016.
Photo courtesy of Sports lllustrated.com 
were offered similar deals in 2016.6 2017 
also saw quality and experienced NBA 
players signing for pennies on the dollar. 
For example, Tyreke Evans is averaging 
19 points, 5 rebounds, and 5 assists for the 
Memphis Grizzlies, but is currently receiv­
ing the veteran’s minimum salary (around 
$1 million).
The league already places regulations 
on the market to protect competitiveness 
and protect teams from themselves, show­
ing that a large cap spike implemented in 
one off-season was a terrible mistake. Just 
a year later, we’ve seen teams either give 
up valuable assets to fix their own mistakes 
or attempt to navigate a world without cap 
space. Lastly, once these contracts come 
off the books in 2020, it will create a sim­
ilar environment to 2016. A plethora of 
teams will find themselves with cap space 
and overspend on subpar talent. Thus, the 
NBA will go through a perpetual four-year 
cycle of overspending; the 2016 off-season 
effectively disrupted the natural order of 
the NBA economy.
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LaVar Ball's JBA: A Pipe's Dream
Syung Hyun (Jason) Bin ‘20
To the people who have been living under a 
rock, LaVar Ball is a father of three profes­
sional basketball players and an entrepre­
neur. He started his rise to fame by making 
outlandish comments in February 2017 
about Lonzo Ball, his first son who played 
basketball for UCLA.1 He compared his 
son to two-time NBA MVP Stephen Cur­
ry, claiming, “Put Steph Curry on UCLA’s 
team right now and put my boy on Golden 
State and watch what happens. ... Steph’s 
going to have problems trying to guard my 
boy. Play one-on-one!”
LaMelo Ball, his third son, helped La­
Var Ball get more attention by scoring 91 
points in a high school game for Chino 
Hills High School. There have been mul­
tiple occasions where high school students 
scored points in triple digits. The reason 
LaMelo got all the attention was due to his 
style of play, where he waited at half-court 
and “cherry-picked” all the points. More­
over, LaVar Ball made statements on how 
he would beat Hall of Famers Charles Bar­
kley and Michael Jordan one-on-one, told a 
female host to “stay in yo lane” when she 
attempted to ask a question, and predicted 
the Los Angeles Lakers to pick Lonzo Ball 
right after the lottery announcements, or as 
he puts it, “spoke it into existence”.2 For all 
these reasons and more, LaVar Ball has es­
tablished himself as an outspoken, energet­
ic, and borderline crazy figure in the sports 
world.
Another story that has been developing 
is the scandals surrounding the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). 
The seed was planted in 2005, when the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) 
collective bargaining agreement required a 
one-year gap between high school and draft 
eligibility.3 Athletes who aspired to make it 
to the NBA were given a choice to either go 
to college, the NBA development league, 
or abroad. Frankly, there is usually only 
one right choice for top athletes who want­
ed to make it to the NBA: college. Division 
I basketball has the highest level of compe­
tition out of all the other choices. 85% of 
players that got drafted in the first round of 
the NBA draft attended a college program 
in the past ten years.
The NCAA created over one billion 
dollars in revenue in 2014.4 The March 
Madness tournament alone brings in $900 
million per year in television broadcasting 
rights. Unfortunately, the athletes that make 
it happen get paid zero dollars. Duke’s bas­
ketball coach, Mike Krzyzewski, earns $9 
million per year, and Kentucky’s basketball 
coach, John Calipari, earns $8 million per 
year, but the athletes themselves still do 
not receive wages.5 It seems odd that the 
players that make it all happen are not paid 
a single penny. Moreover, with the cur­
rent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
probe and the controversy over paying 
players to sign with certain colleges, the 
NCAA is facing a tough challenge.
So what is LaVar Ball’s opinion on 
this matter? LaMelo Ball got a signature 
shoe from the Big Bailer Brand, the family 
company that LaVar founded, in Septem­
ber 2017. This became an issue as Article 
12 of the NCAA Division 1 Manual states 
that “an individual loses amateur status and 
thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate 
competition in a particular sport if the indi­
vidual (a) uses his or her athletic skills (di­
rectly or indirectly) for pay in any fonn in 
that sport; [or] (b) accepts a promise of pay 
even if such pay is to be received follow­
ing completion of intercollegiate athletics 
participation.”6 LaMelo was committed to 
play for the UCLA men’s basketball team 
after graduating high school, but the shoe 
put that in jeopardy. Furthermore, LiAnge- 
lo Ball, the second Ball brother, was arrest­
ed in China for shoplifting and put on in­
definite suspension by UCLA.7 LaVar Ball 
then pulled both of them from high school 
and college respectively to prepare them 
for the NBA draft. His discontent towards 
the NCAA was clear, as he agreed with the 
President of the NCAA who stated “Is this a 
part of someone being part of your univer­
sity as a student-athlete, or is it about using 
college athletics to prepare yourself to be a 
pro? If it is the latter, you shouldn’t be here 
in the first place.” As a result of this, Ball 
decided to create his own league for gradu­
ated high school students, called the Junior 
Basketball Association (JBA).
LaVar Ball has made some explicit 
statements toward the NCAA. “For de­
cades, the NCAA has run a business that 
has exploited thousands of teens, while col­
lege institutions, coaches, media conglom­
erates, and corporate sponsors have all 
profited from the model.”8 As the contro­
versy of the NCAA grew, LaVar Ball chose 
the perfect time to experiment his idea. The
LaVar Ball with his oldest son, Lonzo Ball of the Los Angeles Lakers.
Photo courtesy ofTheScore.com
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JBA targets nationally ranked high school 
players with hopes of playing in the NBA. 
He plans on paying high school graduates a 
range of $3,000-$ 10,000 a month depend­
ing on their ranking. The league, as LaVar 
Ball mentions, will be fully funded by the 
Big Bailer Brand. Since the league is pro­
moted by the Big Bailer Brand, every par­
ticipant will be required to have Big Bailer 
Brand gear on while participating. The cur­
rent plan is to compile ten teams of eight 
players to compete at NBA arenas in Los 
Angeles, Dallas, Brooklyn and Atlanta.9
LaVar Ball’s JBA can potentially cause 
major changes to the whole process of be­
coming a professional basketball player. 
If the JBA is able to draw enough talent, 
the NCAA will have to change their meth­
od of recruitment. Players committed to 
well-known schools with renown coaches 
will be hard to poach, but the elite players 
committed to mid-major colleges could be 
swayed. The parity of the NCAA could be 
damaged, one of their strongest traits will 
be nullified. Another change that could be 
made is that the JBA will produce mature 
and financially knowledgeable profession­
als. Talented college freshmen declare for 
the draft because of their high draft stock 
and their need for money. If they decide 
to join the JBA, they will have a stable 
and manageable income, and learn more
"LaVar Ball's JBA can 
potentially cause major 
changes to the whole 
process of becoming a 
professional basketball 
player"
about fiscal management. With their need 
for money absolved, they could opt to stay 
in the league for a couple more years and 
hone their physical abilities.
On the other hand, there are a couple 
of issues that the JBA will face. The league 
cannot host games without players, and re­
cruiting is not as easy as it seems. LaVar 
Ball plans on recruiting the top prospects 
in the country, but most of them have al­
ready committed to playing for their re­
spective colleges. The Big Bailer Brand 
has used social media to direct message 
players, and currently got declined by all of 
the recruits.10 With his connections in the
Amateur Athletic Union, getting enough 10. 
players for the league does not seem to be 
an issue, but the quality of players might
"For some of the 
aforementioned reasons, 
the JBA unfortunately 
seems unsustainable with 
its current plans."
be. Moreover, finance will be a big part of 
that issue too. Renting the stadium, salaries 
for players, referees, coaches and staff, and 
advertisements will all have to be paid for. 
Finding all that money will require spon­
sors, and it could be quite hard to find spon­
sors with LaVar Ball’s notoriety.
The idea of the JBA is refreshing to 
some people who were sick of hearing 
about the NCAA and the issues it has with 
academic integrity of the athletes and re­
cruitment of stars. The players do put in 
a lot of work towards basketball, and it is 
unfair that they have to maintain amateur 
status as the schools profit from them; al­
though education is very important and 
scholarships are granted, it is hard to use 
that argument with the increasing number 
of one-and-done athletes clearly not inter­
ested in the education aspect.
For some of the aforementioned rea­
sons, the JBA unfortunately seems unsus­
tainable with its current plans.
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It's a Whole New Ballgame
Nicholas Palmer ‘21
“Ball game over. World Series over. Yan­
kees win. Theeeeee Yankees win!”
These were the words of New York Yan­
kees radio host John Sterling who had just 
witnessed the New York Yankees defeat 
the Philadelphia Phillies 7-3 to win their 
27th World Series in 2009. That winter, the 
Yankees had signed three big money free 
agents in C.C. Sabathia, Mark Teixeira, and 
A.J. Burnett, and they had the highest pay­
roll in the major leagues at over $201 mil­
lion. The 2009 New York Yankees were the 
last team to win the World Series while also 
having the league’s highest payroll.
As opposed to what the 2009 Yankees 
front office did to build a World Series 
winning roster, the 2016 Chicago Cubs and 
2017 Houston Astros won with cores that 
were mostly made up of graduates of their 
respective farm systems. In today’s MLB, 
more and more teams are beginning to 
adopt this strategy and even the notorious­
ly big spending Yankees are emphasizing 
building from within. This culture change 
in how teams should be built in the MLB 
can be attributed to: the recent success of 
the Cubs and Astros, increased financial
flexibility with free agents and re-signing 
players, and the image of being an under­
dog.
In Game 7 of the 2016 World Series the 
Chicago Cubs trotted out a lineup that in­
cluded five players who graduated from its 
farm system. Headlined by third baseman 
Kris Bryant and slugger Kyle Schwarber, 
the Cubs had a core that helped them end 
their 108-year World Series drought and 
form a team that would be a perennial con­
tender.1 Much like the Cubs, the Houston 
Astros also had a young core comprised 
of second baseman Jose Altuve, shortstop 
Carlos Correa, and center fielder George 
Springer that carried them to the the fran­
chise’s first ever World Series victory this 
past season.2
Other teams in the MLB have taken 
notice of the success the Cubs and Astros 
have had using this philosophy, and top tier 
prospects have become more valuable than 
ever. Teams such as the Chicago White Sox 
have recently traded some of their fran­
chise cornerstones like Chris Sale for some 
of the game’s top prospects. They hope that 
the young studs they got in return for Sale 
- Yoan Moncada and Michael Kopech - can 
be a part of a young nucleus of their own 
that could lead them to a World Series vic­
tory in the coming years.
Building a contender from within 
also comes with financial flexibility that 
helps teams re-sign their young studs and 
acquire veteran players mid-season and 
during the offseason. The Cubs were faced 
with Kris Bryant’s first year of arbitration 
these past Winter Meetings. Had a deal not 
been signed, Bryant would have been one 
of the more sought after free agents if he 
ever made it to the open market. Not only 
is he one of the game’s top third basemen, 
but he is also one of the faces of the Cubs 
franchise who helps to bring them millions 
in apparel and ticket sales each year. Be­
ing that Bryant came up through the Cubs’ 
system, they were able to offer him $10.85 
million dollars to avoid arbitration and 
keep him under team control at least until 
this end of the upcoming season.3 If Bryant 
was a free agent, he would have cost the 
Cubs much more money to re-sign because 
of competition from other teams who could 
have tried to outbid them.
The Astros’ core of players that were 
under team control allowed them to make 
moves at the waiver deadline at the end of 
last season. Even though they were a great 
offensive team who lead the league in runs 
scored, they were in desperate need of 
starting pitching. Luckily the Detroit Tigers 
were looking to rebuild, and they had an 
ace in Justin Verlander that they were look­
ing to get rid of at the waiver trade dead­
line. They were originally having a tough 
time trying to find any buyers for the then 
34-year old ace because he was scheduled 
to make $28 million in 2018. Being that the 
Astros had built their team through the mi­
nor leagues, they were able to orchestrate 
a deal for Verlander and have no trouble 
taking on his salary in 2018 and beyond. 
Verlander was a huge contributor for the 
Astros down the stretch, going 4-1 in his 
six starts in the postseason, and was a big 
reason they were able to secure their first 
ever World Series ring.
Humans are naturally more attracted 
to the underdogs. This dates back to early 
Olympic events and is even featured in the 
biblical story of David and Goliath. Psy­
chologists attribute this to humans seeing 
underdogs as hardworking and more lik-
The Astros, led by World Series MVP George Springer, celebrate their first World Series victory.
Photo courtesty of Entertainment Weekly
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able in general.4 Building an MLB team 
from within is associated with being an 
underdog. Fans see these teams as beat­
ing the odds because they are not building 
their teams by outspending everyone, but 
instead they are developing their players 
through the minor leagues.
When the Cubs first emerged in 2014 
as an up and coming franchise, they were 
valued at $1.2 billion. As of 2017 the Cubs 
have more than doubled in value to $2.68
"When the next franchise 
player is traded for a 
collection of prospects, just 
know that they will likely 
form the nucleus of the 
next World Series 
contender"
billion, and it has been fueled by increased 
merchandise sales and sponsorships.5 Cubs 
players Kris Bryant, Anthony Rizzo, Javi­
er Baez, and Kyle Schwarber all ranked in 
the top twenty in jersey sales in 2017 and 
are some of the premier faces of the MLB.6 
The Cubs have also secured lucrative spon­
sorship deals with companies such as Beam 
Suntory, the makers of Jim Beam, and Boe­
ing, which will help increase exposure for 
the franchise all over the world.7
After the Astros won the franchise’s 
first World Series this past season, manage­
ment leveraged it as a way to boost reve­
nue through season ticket sales. Row-based 
pricing strategies were implemented to try 
and stimulate sales for some of the more 
sought after seats such as those behind the 
dugouts. These strategies offered fans the 
opportunity to buy multiple seats along one 
row with added benefits like food vouchers 
that came with the tickets. The initiative 
was largely successful and it helped to raise 
the prices of these tickets by up to 80%.8
The idea of building a team through the 
minor leagues is gaining more and more 
steam as the MLB moves forward. Gone 
are the days of the highest paid team be­
ing the most dominant and prospects are 
more valuable than ever. When the next 
franchise player is traded for a collection 
of prospects, just know that they will likely 
form the nucleus of the next World Series 
contender.
After winning the NL MVP in 2016, Kris Bryant solidified himself as a premier face of the MLB.
Photo courtesty of NY Daily News
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How Soon is Too Soon to Pay NFL
Quarterbacks?
Phillip Salmo ‘20
On February 8th, 2018, Jimmy Garoppo- 
lo signed a record 5 year, $137.5 million 
contract with the San Francisco 49ers. This 
deal is the largest in NFL history on an 
average-per-year basis, with Garoppolo’s 
$27.5 million per year average surpass­
ing Matthew Stafford’s average of $27 
million per year. He will earn $61.2 mil­
lion in the first two years, $48.7 million 
of which is guaranteed at signing.1 If one 
were to know nothing about Garoppolo’s 
experience or performance with the 49ers, 
one would think that he is a player with a 
great deal of experience and success. Per­
haps they would even think that he has 
had great playoff success. However, prior 
to joining San Francisco, he was a backup 
for the New England Patriots, only starting 
2 games. Most importantly, he has only 
started five games for his new team. That 
being said, he won all five of those starts, 
and jump-started a previously ineffective 
offense by increasing its points scored from 
17 to 28 points per game.2 Nonetheless, his 
success has been fairly recent, and he still 
has a great deal to prove next season. For
Jimmy Garoppolo's $27.5 million dollar per 
year average salary was the highest in NFL 
history at the time of the signing, only 
surpassed this past March by Kirk Cousins of 
the Minnesota Vikings.
Photo courtesty of The New YorkTimes
some context, Garoppolo’s potential for 
total earnings on his new contract equals 
the amount of money that Aaron Rodgers 
has made over the entirety of his career.3 It 
is hard to fathom that Jimmy Garoppolo is 
in the same pay range as Aaron Rodgers, a 
perennial Pro-Bowler who many consider 
to be one of the most skilled quarterbacks 
of all time. Ultimately, the contract reflects 
what the 49ers believe that Garoppolo will 
be: a franchise quarterback.
This is not the first time that quarter­
backs have been rewarded with such mon­
ey this soon (Matt Flynn or Brock Oswei- 
ler, anyone?), and it certainly won’t be the 
last, with Nick Foies, who only started 
three games during the regular season after 
the injury to starter Carson Wentz, leading 
the Eagles to their first Super Bowl cham­
pionship as a backup. But the question is, 
should these quarterbacks be given such 
extravagant contracts after brief periods of 
success?
Garoppolo’s contract is certainly not 
the first time that quarterbacks have been 
awarded contracts that were larger than ex­
pected after only brief periods of success. 
As some may remember, Matt Flynn re­
ceived a 3 year, $26 million contract from 
the Seattle Seahawks in 2012.4 If one were 
to have trouble remembering what team 
Flynn started for, there would be a very 
valid reason for this. Flynn acted as Aaron 
Rodgers’ backup for a number of years on 
the Packers, and then threw for 480 yards 
(in one of his two starts for the Packers) 
against the Detroit Lions. He was given 
his contract essentially on the basis of this 
one game. He ultimately was beat out for 
the starting QB position by rookie Russell 
Wilson, having not started one game for the 
team. The contract was recently ranked the 
5th worst ever in NFL history by ESPN.5
More recently in the public’s conscious­
ness was the 4 year, $72 million contract 
given to Brock Osweiler by the Houston 
Texans after he started only seven games 
for the Denver Broncos. His record was 
most likely a contributing factor to his con­
tract, as he went 5-2 as a starter during the 
Broncos’ Super Bowl-winning season. He 
ultimately underperformed the next season,
however, throwing for only 15 touchdowns 
against 16 interceptions and was not suc­
cessful with Houston, only spending one 
season there.6 Ultimately, these contracts 
show that the problem with overpaying 
quarterbacks is not a recent development, 
and that often these large contracts based 
on brief periods of success have seldom 
been warranted based on the subsequent 
lack of success.
Garoppolo’s new contract will continue 
to perpetuate problems with the spending 
patterns of NFL teams. It will continue to 
perpetuate the notion that the quarterback 
is the most important person on the team. 
While many would agree with this senti­
ment, it nonetheless means that teams will 
search for a great quarterback at all costs. 
This even means paying an above-aver­
age quarterback the type of money that an 
excellent quarterback should be making. 
However, one could question the logic of 
this decision based on a variety of factors.
Firstly, there is only a correlation co­
efficient of 0.38 between a quarterback’s 
winning percentage during a season and 
the cap hit percentage during the same sea­
son.7 That coefficient is statistically mean­
ingless, showing that there is no correlation 
between a quarterback’s compensation and 
how many games he wins.8 These statistics
"...there is no correlation 
between a quarterback's 
compensation and how 
many games he wins."8
become troubling when one considers the 
cap hit that “franchise quarterbacks” often 
make on their teams. While the average 
percentage of cap space taken up by quar­
terbacks is 8%, 10 quarterbacks take up 
over 11%, and some near 20%.9 This is sig­
nificant because the average percentage of 
cap space taken up by Super Bowl-winning 
quarterbacks since 1994 is only 6.9%.10 
These contracts, and in turn the cap hits, 
will only continue to grow based on the ris­
ing salary cap, which is rising faster than 
the contracts being given out." As the sal­
ary cap has jumped by at least $10 million
16 Sports, In c
Many have speculated about where Nick Foies will ultimately play next season after leading the 
Philadelphia Eagles to their first Super Bowl Championship as a backup.
in four consecutive seasons, teams have 
struggled to keep up with the salary cap 
with the contracts they are handing out.12
What implications do these statistics 
have for Jimmy Garoppolo and other future 
quarterbacks who receive large contracts 
after just brief periods of success? Ulti­
mately, while encompassing a fairly signif­
icant cap hit to their respective teams, such 
quarterbacks will only continue to be given 
larger contracts based on the rising salary 
cap, with no guarantee that this extra mon­
ey will produce more wins for the team.
The cycle of paying NFL quarterbacks 
excessive amounts of money will only con­
tinue to grow with time based on current 
trends. Most recently, Kirk Cousins was 
given a 3 year, $84 million contract by the 
Minnesota Vikings that was fully guaran­
teed, despite only being selected to one Pro 
Bowl and leading his team to one playoff 
game in his three years as a starter for the 
Washington Redskins.13
However, one need look no further than 
Nick Foies to see how this trend will con­
tinue into the future. After his Super Bowl 
win, many believe that the Eagles will be 
able to get a great deal for the quarterback 
should they choose to trade him. In fact, 
Bill Polian, former Indianapolis Colts Vice 
President and current ESPN analyst, said 
that, if he was the Eagles general manager, 
that “he would not listen to any offers for
"In fact, Bill Polian, former 
Indianapolis Colts Vice 
President and current ESPN 
analyst, said that, if he was 
the Eagles general manager, 
that "he would not listen to 
any offers for Nick Foies 
unless they started with two 
l's and two 2's "14
Nick Foies unless they started with two l ’s 
and two 2’s.”14 This quote from a trusted 
NFL insider is very telling because it illus­
trates how NFL teams are most likely view 
ing Foies. This is not to take anything away 
from Foies’ accomplishment, but rather 
just to make the point that a team ought to 
consider his limited run of success, as well 
as the pieces that he had around him, be­
fore investing that much in one player. It 
is also important to consider if this tenden­
cy to pay players based on brief periods of 
success could extend to other positions. In 
terms of the players that could eventually 
be treated similarly to quarterbacks, wide 
receivers would be the top choice because 
of their great potential to impact a game 
and because of the media-friendly person­
ality of many of the top wide receivers. 
This could become incredibly problematic 
if teams become far too willing to award 
players with huge contracts after short pe­
riods of time, regardless of position.
In conclusion, it seems as though many 
NFL teams, through their financial treat­
ment of quarterbacks, are becoming more 
willing to spend mass amounts on players 
after brief periods of success. This emerg­
ing trend is important to recognize both 
because it reflects attitudes towards quar­
terbacks (in the sense that it reflects the be­
lief that a great quarterback is the answer 
to all of a team’s woes) and the fact that 
the impulsive spending patterns of many 
teams is and will continue to be problem­
atic. Based on the distinct lack of success 
associated with this impulsive spending, 
teams ought to give more careful thought 
to rewarding quarterbacks with such huge 
contracts for brief periods of success. As no 
one knows how Jimmy Garoppolo will fare 
in the upcoming season, the question still 
remains “will the contract have been worth 
it?” Based on how previous quarterbacks in 
similar situations have fared, the odds are 
not in his favor. It remains to be seen if he 
breaks the trend.
Photo courtesty ofTexas Monthly
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To Pay or Not to Pay? 
An Analysis of Luxury Tax 
Expenditures in the NBA
The 2016 NBA Champion Cleveland Cavaliers not only made NBA history by coming back from a 
3-1 deficit, they also paid for the second largest luxury tax bill in NBA history at $53,581,331.
Dean Hasan ‘21
In the 15 years since the 2002-2003 season, 
103 teams have paid luxury tax penalties. 
Of those teams, roughly 77% made the 
playoffs, 23% made the Finals, and 10% 
won a championship. In the last 15 years, 
exactly two-thirds of NBA Finals partic­
ipants and NBA Champions have been 
teams in the luxury tax. This season, five 
teams paid luxury tax penalties, and all 
five appear to be playoff-bound (Cleve­
land Cavaliers, Golden State Warriors, 
Milwaukee Bucks, Portland Trail Blazers, 
and the Toronto Raptors),1 so the trend of 
luxury-tax-paying champions may contin­
ue. Logically, it makes sense that luxury 
tax teams win championships. Teams that 
are in the luxury tax are often there because 
they have many high-profile players that 
demand massive contracts. However, pay­
ing more money doesn’t necessarily guar­
antee success. Take for example the 2003, 
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2014 
New York Knicks in Figure 1.
The Knicks are responsible for the 
4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 12th, 13th, and 19th 
highest luxury tax bills in NBA history. 
Across these seven seasons, they paid out
Photo courtesty of NBA.com
$226,436,006 in luxury tax, and have one 
7th place finish (where they were below 
.500) and a first round exit to show for it.
Only three teams have paid more luxury 
tax in a single year than the 2007 Knicks 
($45,142,002). Third place belongs to the 
2003 Portland Trail Blazers, who paid out 
$51,971,000 in luxury tax penalties. They 
went a respectable 50-32, which was good 
for a 6th place finish and a first round exit. 
Second is the 2016 Cleveland Cavaliers, 
who paid $53,581,331, finished first with a 
57-25 record, and won their first champi­
onship in franchise history. In first place is 
the 2014 Brooklyn Nets, who paid an NBA
"In the last 15 years, 
exactly two-thirds of NBA 
Finals participants and NBA 
Champions have been 
teams in the luxury tax."
record $90,570,781 in luxury tax penal­
ties, went 44-38 (good for 6th in confer­
ence), and exited the playoffs in the second 
round.3
Y e a r L u x u ry  T ax  
P a id  (U S D )
R eco rd C o n fe re n c e
F in ish
P la y o f f  F in ish
2 003 $ 2 4 ,3 7 1 ,0 0 0 37-45 10th D id n ’t  M a k e  P la y o ffs
2 0 0 4 $ 3 9 ,8 6 7 ,2 1 4 39-43 7 th L o s t 1st R o u n d
2 0 0 6 $ 3 7 ,2 4 8 ,7 5 2 2 3 -5 9 15th D id n ’t  M a k e  P la y o ffs
2 007 $ 4 5 ,1 4 2 ,0 0 2 3 3 -4 9 12th D id n ’t  M a k e  P la y o ffs
2008 $ 1 9 ,7 2 3 ,9 4 6 2 3 -5 9 14th D id n ’t  M a k e  P la y o ffs
2 0 0 9 $ 2 3 ,7 3 6 ,2 0 7 3 2 -5 0 14th D id n ’t  M a k e  P la y o ffs
2 0 1 4 $ 3 6 ,3 4 6 ,8 8 5 37-4 5 9 th D id n ’t M a k e  P la y o ffs
Figure I.2 2003-2004, 2006-2009, 2014 New York Knicks, Luxury Tax Paid 
compared to regular season record, conference finish, and playoff finish.
18 Sports, Inc.
Dollars Above Tax Level Non-Repeater Penalties Repeater Penalties
Lower Limit Upper Limit Tax Rate per 
Dollar
Incremental
Maximum
Tax Rate per 
Dollar
Incremental
Maximum
$0 $4,999,999 $1.50 $7.5 MM $2.50 $12.5 MM
$5,000,000 $9,999,999 $1.75 $8.75 MM $2.75 $13.75 MM
$10,000,000 $14,999,999 $2.50 $12.5 MM $3.50 $17.5 MM
$15,000,000 $19,999,999 $3.25 $16.25 MM $4.25 $21.25 MM
$20,000,000 N/A $3.75,
increases $.50 
each additional 
$5 MM
N/A $4.75,
increases $.50 
each additional 
$5 MM
N/A
Figure 2.6 NBA Luxury Tax rates sorted by non-repeat and repeat offenders, 
as well as by dollar amount over tax level.
So what exactly is the luxury tax? In 
the NBA, a certain amount of money can 
be used on player contracts for each team. 
This amount is called the salary cap, and it 
is calculated by taking 44.74% of the pro­
jected Basketball Related Income (BRi), 
subtracting projected benefits, and then 
dividing by the number of teams in the 
league.4 The NBA’s salary cap is known as 
a soft salary cap, meaning that there are var­
ious ways that teams can legally exceed the 
designated salary cap, however, there is a 
limit that teams cannot exceed without pay­
ing penalties, which is known as the luxury 
tax. The luxury tax is calculated by taking 
53.51% of the projected BRI, subtracting 
projected benefits, and then dividing by the 
number of teams in the league.5 Essentially 
there is room for teams to exceed the salary 
cap without going into the luxury tax, but 
at a certain point, teams must pay penalties 
based on how much they have exceeded 
the predetermined tax level. Teams that are 
repeat offenders face higher penalties. The 
tax rates are described by Figure 2.
The data from Figure 1 about the Knicks 
isn’t so much a knock to them as an organ­
ization as it is a caution that breaking the 
salary cap and paying out tens of millions 
of dollars in luxury tax fees does not guar­
antee championships (or even a winning 
season) for your team. However, the fact 
of the matter is that 79/103, or about 77% 
of the teams who have paid the luxury tax 
have also made it to the playoffs.7
So is the luxury tax worth it? Based 
on the fact that historically, 77% of luxury
tax teams have made the playoffs, and that 
ten of the last fifteen champions have been 
luxury tax payers, the quick answer would 
be yes. In fact, further investigation shows 
largely the same thing. To reach this con­
clusion I compiled data and attempted to 
answer two questions.
Firstly, do teams that pay the luxury tax 
actually perform better than their non-lux­
ury tax paying counterparts in the regular 
season? What about in the playoffs?
Secondly, I wanted to figure out whether 
or not teams that paid the luxury tax saw 
increases to their revenue. Essentially, I 
wanted to know if teams could increase
their revenue over the previous year to the 
point that the luxury tax payment would be 
a wash, or if the luxury tax payments would 
overshadow changes in team revenue.
To answer the first question, I gathered 
the records of every team from the last 15 
years, calculated their win percentage, and 
sorted them into two groups: Euxury Tax 
Teams and Non-Euxury Tax Teams. I chose 
to use win percentage rather than wins due 
to the lockout-shortened 2011-2012 sea­
son, which had 66 games as opposed to 82 
games. It felt far more accurate to simply 
use win percentage rather than extrapolate 
from 66 to 82 games or throw out the data 
from this season (especially since the 2004- 
2005 season already had to be excluded 
since there was no luxury tax that season).
Essentially what I found that is that on 
average, luxury tax teams win a signifi­
cantly higher percentage of games than 
their non-luxury tax counterparts across 
the board, every single year (see Figure 3).
Next, I analyzed the playoff success 
of these teams. Teams were given numeric 
scores that indicated their playoff success 
as follows:
l=Team Did Not Make Playoffs 
2=Team Lost in the 1 st round 
3=Team Lost in the 2nd round 
4=Team Lost in Eastem/Westem Confer­
ence Finals 
5=Team Lost in Finals 
6=NBA Champion
Average Win Percentage, Non-Luxury Tax Teams Vs. Luxury Tax Teams, 2003-2017
0.8
0.7
■  Average Win Percentage of Non-Luxury Tax Teams ■  Average Win Percentage of Luxury Tax Teams
Figure 3.8 Average Win Percentage of Non-Luxury Tax Teams (Blue) vs. Average Win Percentage 
of Luxury Tax Teams (Orange).
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Figure 4.9 Average Playoff Finish of Non-Luxury Tax Teams (Blue) vs.
Average Playoff Finish of Luxury Tax Teams (Orange), 2003-2004, 2006-2017.
After averaging the playoff finishes, 
separating luxury tax and non-luxury tax 
teams, I found that luxury tax teams also 
average more playoff appearances and 
more success once in the playoffs than their 
non-luxury tax counterparts (see Figure 4).
Even when only considering teams that 
made it to the playoffs (i.e.: all l ’s taken 
out, only 2-6 used), the results were still 
largely the same (see Figure 5). The gap 
between the two groups closed consider­
ably; however luxury tax teams still per­
formed better than non-luxury tax teams in 
the playoffs across the board.
Quite definitively, in both the regular 
season and the playoffs, luxury tax teams 
fared far better than non-luxury tax teams.
My next task was to figure out how much 
of a detriment paying the luxury tax was to 
organizations. I did this by comparing the 
luxury tax that the team paid for that year to 
their change in revenue from the previous 
year. A couple things to note were that I cut 
out the 2011-2012 lockout season as well 
as the 2012-2013 season. My reasoning for 
this was that only 66 games were played in 
the 2011-2012 season, so teams were miss­
ing 16 games’ worth of revenue. Revenue 
for teams was down across the board from 
the previous year. I also excluded the data 
from the 2012-2013 season for consisten­
cy’s sake because the revenue changes 
were astronomical going from a season in 
which only 66 games were played back to 
a regular 82 game season. Even with these 
two years removed, the results were quite 
staggering.
In years that teams spent money on
the luxury tax, less than 21% of teams saw 
a drop in revenue from the previous year, 
about 10% saw no change in revenue, and 
the other nearly 70% of teams saw an in­
crease in revenue. Additionally, 11 of the 
19 teams that did see a drop in revenue 
only decreased their revenue by $3 million 
or less, and the largest revenue drop of any 
team was only $9 million."
Roughly 35% of the teams were able to 
increase their revenue to the point that the 
luxury tax penalties were a wash (i.e.: The 
difference between revenue change and 
luxury tax paid is greater than or equal to 
0). The other 65% of teams were not able to 
do so, however almost 25% of those teams 
had their luxury tax payments exceed their 
revenue changes by $5 million or less, and 
nearly 50% of the teams had their luxury
tax payments exceed their revenue changes 
by $10 million or less.12 Lastly, for the sake 
of the argument, let’s assume that spending 
money on the luxury tax directly correlates 
to a change in revenue. Given that luxury 
tax dollars are often spent to both acquire- 
and lock up star players, it is certainly pos­
sible that this is the case. Considering the 
success of these luxury tax teams, it is also 
highly likely that viewership, ticket sales, 
and merchandise sales have increased, as 
fan support often increases when teams are 
successful. If luxury tax expenditures are 
in fact directly responsible for a change in 
revenue, then on average, per luxury tax 
dollar spent, organizations increased their 
revenue by an average of about $3.6414 per 
dollar, which is quite the return. There are 
definitely some outliers, so to find a more 
realistic number that better accounts for 
some of the outliers, I found the median 
of the group, which came out to $0.56 per 
dollar. By this figure, we would find that 
50% of teams were able to increase their 
revenue by at minimum $0.56 per luxury 
tax dollar spent,15 which is still pretty re­
spectable. Although we cannot conclude 
revenue change is in fact dependent on lux­
ury tax (in which case these values would 
not be accurate), it is certainly intriguing to 
ponder the earning potential that may arise 
from owners going above and beyond the 
salary cap and delving into the luxury tax.
In conclusion, I didn’t expect the dis­
parity between non-luxury tax and luxury 
tax teams to be this great. On top of the im­
mense regular season and playoff success 
that these luxury tax teams enjoyed, the
Average Playoff Finish, Non-Luxury Tax Vs. Luxury Tax Teams (Non-Playoff Teams Removed)
4
■  Average Playoff Finish of Non-Luxury Tax Teams ■  Average Playoff Finish of Luxury TaxTeams
Figure 5.10 Average Playoff Finish of Non-Luxury Tax Teams (Blue) vs.
Average Playoff Finish of Luxury Tax Teams (Orange), 
Non-Playoff Teams Excluded, 2003-2004, 2006-2017.
20 Sports, Inc.
Despite paying an NBA record $90,570,781 in luxury tax penalties,
the 2014 Brooklyn Nets still found themselves getting bounced from
the playoffs in the second round after losing 4-1 to the eventual runner-up Miami Heat.
Photo courtesty of Fansided.com
vast majority of these teams were able to 
increase revenue while doing so. Although 
the majority of teams did not increase their 
revenue to the point that it matched their 
luxury tax payments, the data still seems to 
indicate that it may be worthwhile both for 
team and financial success to delve into the 
luxury tax. It will certainly be interesting 
and worthwhile to see if this trend contin­
ues in the coming years.
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Revenue Change ($) vs. Luxury Tax Paid ($)
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Figure 6.13 Revenue Change (Y-axis) vs. Luxury Tax Paid (X-axis) in U.S. Dollars. Negative Revenue Dean Hasan is a freshman in the ILR school.
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